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Tort Law.  Rhode Island Industrial-Recreational Building 
Authority v. Capco Endurance, LLC, 203 A.3d 494 (R.I. 2019).  The 
Restatement rule restricts an accountant or auditor’s liability for 
negligence “to those third parties who the accountant [or auditor] 
actually knows will receive the information, and then, only for 
transactions that are the same as, or substantially similar to, the 
ones which the accountant [or auditor] actually knows will be 
influenced by the supplied information.”1  
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Plaintiff, The Rhode Island Industrial-Recreational Building 
Authority (IRBA), an insurer of bonds for limited liability 
companies,2 brought a negligence action against Feeley & Driscoll, 
P.C. (Feeley), an accounting firm.3  Feeley prepared a 2009 Audit
Report concerning Capco Steel, LLC’s and Capco Endurance, LLC’s
(collectively, Capco) annual financial statements.4  IRBA asserted
that Feeley negligently prepared the 2009 Audit Report and that
IRBA subsequently relied upon this report when approving a
temporary increase in Capco’s revolving line of credit.5
In February of 2010, there were two separate transactions, 
relevant here.6  First, Webster Bank (Webster) provided Capco with 
a twenty million dollar revolving line of credit and agreed to make 
a six million dollar term loan to Capco by purchasing six million 
dollars of bonds from the Rhode Island Industrial Facilities 
Corporation.7  Second, IRBA agreed to insure the bonds up to the 
1. R.I. Indus.-Recreational Bldg. Auth. v. Capco Endurance, LLC, 203
A.3d 494, 501 (R.I. 2019) (quoting N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Lapalme, 258
F.3d 35, 40 (1st Cir. 2001)).
2. Id. at 494.
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amount of five million dollars.8  In March of 2010, the original line 
of credit transaction involving Capco and Webster closed.9  Prior to 
closing, Webster provided Capco with its “Summary of Committed 
Terms and Conditions” which required Capco to provide Webster 
with “annual CPA-prepared, audited consolidated financial 
statements” over the course of the term of the loan.10  In April of 
2010, “Feeley issued the 2009 Audit Report to Capco, wherein it 
indicated that Capco had earned a profit of $552,000 in 2009.”11  
Thereafter, on June 15, 2010, the original bond transaction 
involving IRBA closed.12 
In early 2011, “Capco sought to extend its revolving line of 
credit to twenty-three and a half million dollars for a period of six 
months.”13  In March of 2011, IRBA consented to Capco and 
Webster’s request for the temporary extension.14  In approving the 
first credit increase, IRBA asserted that it relied on the 2009 Audit 
Report.15  In June of 2011, Capco’s relationship with Feeley ended 
and Capco employed a new auditing firm.16  This auditing firm 
indicated that Feeley’s 2009 Audit Report was incorrect and Capco 
had lost approximately one and a half million dollars in 2009.17  
However, “Feeley [did] not concede that the 2009 Audit Report was 
erroneous or negligently prepared.”18 
In August of 2011, a second request was made to IRBA “to 
consent to a further extension of Capco’s line of credit to over 





12. Id.  Capco did not provide IRBA with a copy of the 2009 Audit Report
either at or before the closing on the original bond transaction.  Therefore, the 
Court was not concerned with IRBA’s reliance on the 2009 Audit Report as 
applied to the original line of credit transaction or the original bond 
transaction; “IRBA could not have relied on a document it did not have.”  Id. 
13. Id.
14. Id.  This is the first credit increase.  “[F]or the purpose of the instant
appeal, [the Court was] concerned only with IRBA’s alleged reliance on the 
2009 Audit Report with respect to the first credit increase.”  Id. at 497–98.  
15. Id.
16. Id. at 498.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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interest to that of Webster.”19  IRBA consented to both requests.20  
In March of 2012, “Capco failed to make required payments on the 
bonds, thus triggering IRBA’s obligation as the insurer of five 
million dollars worth of the bonds.”21   
On May 1, 2013, IRBA filed the instant action alleging that 
Feeley negligently prepared the 2009 Audit Report.22  In August of 
2015, Feeley moved for summary judgment.23  In a January 15, 
2016 order by the hearing justice, the parties were given until 
February 29, 2016 to complete discovery.24  Thereafter, on October 
20, 2016, Feeley renewed its motion for summary judgment, which 
the hearing justice granted on March 3, 2017.25  Since the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court (the Court) had not yet adopted a test to 
resolve the issue of whether a duty exists between an accountant or 
auditor and a third party, the hearing justice adopted “the 
Restatement approach” and held that Feeley did not owe a duty to 
IRBA.26  On April 10, 2017, the hearing justice granted Feeley’s 
renewed motion for summary judgment.27  IRBA filed a timely 
notice of appeal.28 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Court reviews the grant of a motion for summary judgment 
de novo.29  When considering whether a duty of care exists between 
an accountant or auditor and a third party, courts have relied upon 
three alternative legal standards: (1) the near-privity test; (2) the 
Restatement rule; and (3) the reasonable foreseeability rule.30  The 
Court, in agreement with the hearing justice and the parties, 
19. Id.






26. Id. at 498–99.
27. Id. at 499.
28. Id.
29. Id. (citing Newstone Dev., LLC v. East Pac., LLC, 140 A.3d 100, 103
(R.I. 2016)). 
30. Id. at 500–01.
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adopted the Restatement rule as its analytical approach.31  The 
Restatement rule, in pertinent part, essentially “limits an 
accountant’s liability for negligent misrepresentation to those third 
parties who the accountant actually knows will receive the 
information, and then, only for transactions that are the same as, 
or substantially similar to, the ones which the accountant actually 
knows will be influenced by the supplied information.”32  On 
appeal, IRBA restricted the focus of its argument to the language 
contained in section (2)(b) of the Restatement rule.33  Therefore, the 
issue on appeal was whether IRBA relied on the 2009 Audit Report 
“in a transaction [where Feeley] intend[ed] the information to 
influence or [knew] that [Capco] so intend[ed] or in a substantially 
similar transaction.”34 
IRBA’s first contention on appeal was that the Restatement 
rule was satisfied because  
it is reasonable to infer that [Feeley] knew when it issued 
the 2009 [A]udit [R]eport that . . . Webster and IRBA would 
be relying on Capco’s audited financial statements . . . 
during the [t]ransaction for the purpose of making business 
31. Id. at 501–02.
32. Id. at 501 (quoting N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Lapalme, 258 F.3d 35,
40 (1st Cir. 2001)).  The Restatement provides: 
“(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, 
or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, 
supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business 
transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them 
by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise 
reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the 
information. 
“(2) * * * the liability stated in Subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered 
“(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit 
and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the 
recipient intends to supply it; and 
“(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the 
information to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a 
substantially similar transaction.” 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 at 126–27 (1977) (emphasis in original). 
33. R.I. Indus.-Recreational Bldg. Auth., 203 A.3d at 502.
34. Id.
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decisions concerning their respective interests in the 
[t]ransaction.35
The Court rejected that argument because IRBA had essentially 
asked the Court to apply the reasonable foreseeability rule.36  
Utilizing the Restatement rule, the Court stated that an 
accountant’s liability is limited to those transactions “that are the 
same as, or substantially similar to, the ones which the accountant 
actually knows will be influenced by the supplied information.”37  
Further, “[t]he accountant’s knowledge is to be measured at the 
moment [a report was] published, not by the foreseeable path of 
harm envisioned by [litigants] years following an unfortunate 
business decision.”38  Here, Feeley could not have intended that, at 
the time the 2009 Audit Report was issued, the report would 
influence a future transaction.39  The Court ultimately declined to 
expose an accountant or auditor “to the broad scope of potential 
liability” that IRBA’s proffered methodology would create.40 
IRBA’s second contention on appeal was that Feeley owed a 
duty of care to IRBA under the Restatement rule because the 
original line of credit and bond transactions and the first credit 
increase were “substantially similar.”41  The United States Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit established that “transactions are 
substantially similar when the ‘essential character’—the amount 
and terms of the credit—has not changed.”42  A two-step analysis 
is utilized to guide the substantial similarity analysis.43  First, a 
court must consider, “from the [accountant or auditor’s] standpoint, 
what risks he reasonably perceived he was undertaking when he 
delivered the challenged report or financial statement.”44  Here, in 
producing the 2009 Audit Report, there was a risk that IRBA would 
35. Id. at 502–03.
36. Id. at 503.
37. Id. (quoting N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co., 258 F.3d at 40) (emphasis in
original). 
38. Id. (quoting Nycal Corp. v. KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, 688 N.E.2d
1368, 1372–73 (Mass. 1998)). 
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 504.
42. Id. (quoting N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co., 258 F.3d at 41).
43. Id. at 505.
44. Id.
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rely on the 2009 Audit Report in the original bond transaction.45  
However, the Court stated that “there is no basis in the record for 
concluding that Feeley could have reasonably perceived a risk that 
IRBA would thereafter agree to extend the line of credit, even 
temporarily.”46  Further, “increasing the line of credit increased the 
risk that IRBA would be called upon to make payment on the 
insured bonds.”47  Therefore, the essential character of the 
transactions had materially changed between the original line of 
credit and bond transactions and the first credit increase.48 
The second step of the analysis requires “the court [to] 
undertake an objective comparison between the transaction of 
which the accountant had actual knowledge and the transaction 
that in fact occurred.”49  Here, although the transactions all 
involved a line of credit, the same three parties, and were of the 
same “general nature (e.g., bonds),” that “is not enough to render 
them substantially similar for purposes of the Restatement rule.”50  
Further, the three and a half million dollar increase in the credit 
amount for Capco is not considered a “minor” variance between the 
two transactions.51  Therefore, utilizing the Restatement rule, the 
Court concluded that the first credit increase was not substantially 
similar to the original line of credit and bond transactions.52 
IRBA’s third contention on appeal was that Feeley owed a duty 
of care to IRBA because “Feeley had ‘authorized Capco to supply 
information contained in the 2009 [A]udit [R]eport to the parties to 
the [first credit increase], knowing that it would be used to 
influence [the first credit increase transaction].’”53  IRBA argued 
that pursuant to the terms of the “Professional Services Agreement” 
between Feeley and Capco, Capco was required to provide Feeley 
with a copy of Capco’s request for the first credit increase before 






50. Id. at 505–06.
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request, Capco included information from the 2009 Audit Report.55  
Therefore, IRBA maintained that Feeley “authorized Capco to use 
the information contained in the 2009 [A]udit [R]eport for the 
purpose of persuading Webster and IRBA to agree to Capco’s * * * 
request [for the first credit increase].”56  The Court, however, 
remained unconvinced57 because “Feeley did not actively 
participate in the first credit increase transaction, and the record 
contains no written consent to the use of the information in the 2009 
Audit Report.”58  Further, the Court noted that the “Professional 
Services Agreement” referred “only to the publication of any ‘report 
[by Feeley] on the financial statements being audited’” and did not 
contain any provision requiring Capco to “seek Feeley’s approval for 
any possible future use of such a report.”59  Accordingly, the hearing 
justice appropriately granted summary judgment in Feeley’s favor 
because Feeley did not owe a duty of care to IRBA.60 
COMMENTARY 
Although the hearing justice and both parties agreed that the 
Restatement rule was the best analytical approach,61 IRBA alluded 
to the reasonable foreseeability rule in its first contention.62  
Specifically, IRBA argued that it was “reasonably foreseeable that 
IRBA might rely on the 2009 Audit Report for another 
transaction.”63  To bolster its argument, IRBA cited the “‘wide-
ranging’ business relationship between Feeley and Capco.”64  Had 
the Court applied the reasonable foreseeability rule in addressing 
the issue of whether a duty of care exists between an accountant or 




58. Id. at 507.
59. Id. (emphasis in original).
60. Id. at 508.
61. Id. at 500.
62. Id. at 503.  Under the reasonable foreseeability rule, “an accountant
may be held liable to any person whom the accountant could reasonably have 
foreseen would obtain and rely on the accountant’s opinion, including known 
and unknown investors.”  Id. at 501 (quoting Nycal Corp. v. KPMG Peat 
Marwick LLP, 688 N.E.2d 1368, 1370 (Mass. 1998)). 
63. Id.
64. Id. at 502.
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have exposed accountants or auditors to a very broad scope of 
potential liability.65  For instance, after an accountant or auditor 
provides a client with a piece of information, realistically, the 
accountant or auditor cannot control “the further dissemination” of 
the information.66  Therefore, “[t]he foreseeable class of persons 
who can be adversely affected by reliance upon [an accountant or 
auditor’s] advice or opinion can be so large as to make liability to 
third parties a ruinous and catastrophic kind . . . .”67  Here, the 
Court utilized the Restatement rule in order to protect an 
accountant or auditor from a form of third party liability that would 
“unreasonably exceed[] the bounds of their real undertaking.”68 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that, pursuant to the 
Restatement rule, the hearing justice did not err in holding that 
Feeley did not owe a duty of care to IRBA69 because: (1) Feeley 
could not have known that the 2009 Audit Report would influence 
a future transaction; (2) the first credit increase was not 
substantially similar to the original line of credit and bond 
transactions; and (3) Feeley did not authorize Capco to use the 2009 
Audit Report to influence the first credit increase.70  Accordingly, 
summary judgment was appropriately granted in Feeley’s favor.71 
Kerri A. Schulz 
65. Id. at 503.
66. Id. at 501.
67. Id. at 503.
68. Id. at 502.
69. Id. at 508.
70. Id. at 495.
71. Id. at 508.
